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W

hen the Theatre Workshop's production of
'Oh! What a Lovely War" opened in London
in 1963, it came in the middle of a wave of revived
interest in the First World War. As much about
the 1960s as it was about 1914-1918, the
production made another splash in 1969 when
it was transformed into an equally arresting film
by Richard Attenborough. In short order, the film
became the most visual aspect of what Alex
Danchev h a s nicely characterized as the
"'bunking' and debunking" of the First World
War.1
"Oh! What a Lovely War" fleshed out the icons
which, since the late 1950s, had adorned
popularized histories of the war. Among the most
memorable characters of the film were John
Mills as Sir Douglas Haig, a plodding dullard
with the imagination of a turnip, and Laurence
Olivier as Sir John French, garrulous and a tad
randy. At the other end of the spectrum were the
"lions," to use the metaphor adopted by Alan
Clark (from a probably apocryphal remark
attributed to Falkenhayn) as the basis for his
1961 best-seller The Donkeys: the much-tried

and much-misused infantrymen who deserved
better than to be driven to their deaths by
moronic generals.
To these stereotypes we might add a few
more, created by generations of poets, novelists,
and historians since the 1920s. There is the
yammering and jingoistic propagandist viciously
lampooned by Siegfried Sassoon in poems like
"The Effect," "Editorial Impressions," and "Fight
to a Finish." 2 There is the chaplain, also a
favourite target of Sassoon (the Bishop of
Byegumb in his poem "Vicarious Christ" is
another brutal caricature), who exhorted men
into the furnace but was careful not to stray to
close to the fire himself. And finally there were
the politicians, the "old men of Europe," who,
like Nero, fiddled as their world burned.
By the 1970s, these were the central figures
in the conventional wisdom regarding the First
World War. It was a war in which witless generals
(the "donkeys") threw their troops against barbed
wire and machine guns like lambs to the
slaughter, for the simple reason that blinkered
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tactical thinking and limited imagination
prevented them from pursuing any other course.
These "brass hats" fought the enemy in front of
them, but also the enemy behind, the "frock
coats" who spent their days bickering over how
to prosecute the war. The victims of their almost
criminal insanity (the "lions") fought gamely but
inevitably came to despise the generals and
politicians for their callousness, and to discard
their idealism, which seemed completely
irrelevant amongst the supreme futility and
pointlessness of the Western Front. Equally
loathed by the troops were the bibulous
churchmen who supposedly ministered to souls
but whose energies were really directed towards
ensuring that the soldiers were refrained from
drinking, gambling, womanizing, and the other
simple pleasures that were open to them. And
on the home front, dishonest journalists and fat
propagandists ensured that the "stay-at-homes"
continued to believe that the war was a gallant
affair of redcoats and happy warriors.
Sketched in such exaggerated terms, these
c h a r a c t e r s a p p r o a c h the r i d i c u l o u s .
Nevertheless, they have had remarkable staying
power. Fed by such classics as Paul Fussell's The
Great War and Modern Memory (1975), the
conventional wisdom, with its requisite doses
of pathos and tragedy, has provided ample fodder
for popularizers, documentary producers, and
countless undergraduate history and literature
courses. Not until the late 1980s did it come
under any serious challenge and even then the
lions/donkeys theme, and all of the related
stereotypes, stubbornly refused to be unseated.
Fussell now draws strong criticism for a cavalier
disregard of facts, but the caricatures he helped
create retain their appeal.
Debunking the debunkers, to use Danchev's
terms, has become something of a growth
industry, and Crerar, French, Harris, and Keshen
all offer further attempts at revising decades-old
caricatures. David French's book amounts to a
re-examination of the legendary disputes
between generals and politicians, which he
dismisses as postwar finger-pointing engaged in
by men who were desperately trying to shift
blame for tactical disasters onto someone else.
Instead, he argues persuasively that the frock
coats and brass hats were in fact united in the
view that, for Britain, winning the peace was as

important as winning the war. In this reading,
the Battle of Passchendaele becomes an entirely
logical operation, in a strategic if not a tactical
sense: in the context of the time, with the collapse
of Russia, the possible collapse of France, the
success of Germany's submarine offensive, and
the slowness of the American build up, there was
no other option for British policy-makers than
to launch a major offensive in Flanders.
French then asks us to reconsider wartime
rhetoric about British war aims that stressed
the need to stem the threat of German aggression
and ensure the security of the British Empire.
Derided by later observers as an attempt to divert
attention from the fact that the war's causes lay
in tawdry economics, French insists that those
aims were right and j u s t and, despite the
immense human and economic cost of the war
to Britain, were largely realized. Britain,
concludes French, emerged from the war with
immeasurably greater international prestige,
even if the British were unable to recognize it.
As he puts it, "the willingness of British policymakers to sacrifice almost three-quarters of a
million men to defeat the Central Powers made
a profound impression on the minds of its former
enemies" (296), an impression that persisted
until it was destroyed by the appeasers.
J.P. Harris, too, is rather kinder to British
policy-makers than some recent historians. He
declines to view the generals as being "blind to
the o p p o r t u n i t i e s afforded by s u c h new
technologies" as the tank (315), arguing instead
that most army commanders were more than
willing to consider the tank on its own merits
when the idea was first presented to them. Even
Haig, usually stereotyped as a general who
refused to allow any new ideas to enter his mind
after 1904, was "as positive as could reasonably
have been expected given their limited combat
power" (315). In short, Harris puts J.F.C. Fuller
in his place, reminding us to treat warily anything
Fuller said that was later proven correct by the
experience of the Second World War. In the
context of 1916, the tank was a poor solution to
the tactical problems posed by the stalemate on
the Western Front. The wonder is not that GHQ
failed to express more faith in the weapon, but
that they gave it any consideration at all. Just as
the battle of the memoirs was a postwar attempt
at scapegoating, so too was the idolatry of Fuller

126
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol6/iss1/14

2

Vance: Re-Examining Great War Stereotypes

and the tank in the interwar period: if only Haig
had given the tank a chance, so much slaughter
could have been avoided.
Duff Crerar takes on an equally well
entrenched stereotype, the well meaning but
widely despised (at least by the troops) padre,
although this attempt at revisionism is less
successful. It is largely an administrative history,
focusing on the struggle to create an efficient and
effective chaplain service that was free of
favouritism and denominational jealousies. In
this regard it is an excellent study, and an
admirable record of John Almond's tireless
efforts to bring order to the chaos into which
the chaplain service had degenerated under the
tender ministrations of Sam Hughes and his
cronies. Crerar is less convincing when
discussing the impact of chaplains on the
soldiers. He dismisses the traditional view, that
soldier had little respect for chaplains because
few of them were willing to share their dangers
and discomforts, but introduces little fresh
evidence for any contrary view. He also has
relatively little to say about the message conveyed
by chaplains to their charges and does not
venture into an examination of the religion of
the trenches, a curious blend of Salvationist
fundamentalism and superstition. He does,
however, present a convincing variation of an
argument made by other historians: postwar
disillusionment among ex-chaplains did not grow
out of the horrors they had witnessed on the
battlefields, but out of their frustration with a
peacetime society that seemed to betray the
ideals for which the fallen had died. Also worth
mentioning is the book's excessive referencing.
Fully 140 pages of notes for 231 pages of text is
completely uncalled for, and should have been
ruthlessly pruned by an editor.
In light of this prevailing revisionism, it is
perhaps ironic that the portrait of Ernest J.
Chambers, Canada's chief censor, in Keshen's
book is in itself stereotypical. He is shown in
the uniform of Gentleman Usher of the Black
Rod, and appears every bit as true-to-type as if
he had been rendered by Sassoon: pompous,
self-important, humourless, and severe, this
Chambers would have been a perfect subject for
Sassoon's acerbic pen. And yet, as Keshen makes
clear, Chambers was quite different than this
one-dimensional caricature. He may well have
b e e n o v e r - z e a l o u s , p a r t i c u l a r l y when

suppressing the ethnic press, but he was also
diligent (often making himself available at any
hour of the night or day), selfless (he declined a
salary for his work, insisting that the honorarium
he received as Gentleman Usher was sufficient
for his needs), and tactful (preferring to use
personal diplomacy rather than edicts to achieve
the d e s i r e d goals). Whatever l o n g - t e r m
consequences Chambers' work may have had for
ethnic minorities and for the schism between
veterans and stay-at-homes, in the short term
he was successful in ensuring that Canadians
remained committed to the ideals and goals of
the cause. On another level, Keshen also has
some interesting things to say about the publicity
campaigns created for recruiting and fundraising purposes. He provides valuable evidence
for an argument which has long been inferred,
that the ultimate failure of volunteerism in
Canada was as much a failure of marketing and
public relations as anything: if the recruitment
campaigns had been managed as capably as the
Victory Loan drives, conscription might not have
been necessary.
With all of the old stereotypes coming under
reconsideration, one is left to wonder if there
are any foundations left upon which to build a
new conventional wisdom. In a curious way, the
soundest base is provided by the names which
fill over 800 pages of Wigney's book. In what can
only be described as a labour of love, he has
sifted through the records of the Commonwealth
War Graves Commission and the Department of
Militia and Defence, C a n a d a ' s Book of
Remembrance, and c o u n t l e s s regimental
histories and memorial volumes to compile a
register of the 67,000 men and women who died
in uniform from the beginning of the war to the
final demobilization of t h e C a n a d i a n
Expeditionary Force in 1921. The entries are
necessarily brief, confining themselves to name
(including aliases), rank, number, unit, date of
death, place of burial, and any remarks that
could be included in the space available, but tiiey
are sufficient to make the book an invaluable
reference tool. The Roll of Honour also calls into
the reader's mind endless questions about the
thousands of lives cut short. Was Private Deligny
Lambert of the 22nd Battalion celebrating the
Armistice when he died of wood alcohol
poisoning on 17 November 1918? What drove
Corporal Watson Jamieson of the 7th Canadian
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Railway Troops to slit his own throat on 21
January 1918 near Poperinghe? And what of
Private Herbert Jones of the 26th Battalion, who
was only sixteen years old when he went missing
in action on the first day of the Battle of Vimy
Ridge? What experiences had he packed into
those few years of life?
In compiling this record, Wigney is in fact
responding to an impulse felt by Canadians who
lived through the First World War. The Armistice
was followed in this country by an unprecedented
wave of memorialization as communities,
business, churches, and schools felt impelled to
record the names of their fallen in stone or
bronze. They believed fervently that the names
had to be preserved for posterity because, once
the names were forgotten, the ideals for which
lives were lost would disappear as well. They
may well have been right. The ideals for which
the First World War was fought (not to mention
the mentalities with which it was fought) seem,
to many people in the 1990s, strange and
incomprehensible. It is easy to descend into
hand-wringing and tut-tutting, and to fasten
blame for the horrors of the Western Front on a
few broadly drawn caricatures. It is much more
difficult to make the psychic leap back to 1914-
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1918 and see things with contemporary eyes:
how bizarre an idea the tank must have seemed,
how the strategic situation of 1917 made an
attack at Passchendaele seem sensible, or how
passionately people were moved by God, King,
and Empire.
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